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RECENT CASES
1968 Act may be substantially different, the impact of the Jones case is still
minimal in the field of open housing. The 1968 Act applies to practically
everything the statute would cover, and more, as Justice Stewart indicated. 100
Furthermore, the burden of proof under section 1982 makes it almost useless
as a remedy. In the Jones case, the defendants admitted that racial discrimination was the sole reason for not selling the property to the plaintiffs. In the
future, to be realistic, such an admission would be very unlikely, and the discrimination could be disguised so as to make it almost impossible to prove by
other evidentiary means. It would therefore be easier to use the 1968 Civil
Rights Act because of such provisions as those that relate to advertising, services,
facilities, and federal assistance to aggrieved parties. 10 ' Thus, it is reasonable to
argue that the impact of the case is minimal in the area of open housing, and
this fact combined with the other weaknesses of the majority decision could lead
to the conclusion that certiorari should not have been granted.
Despite the weaknesses in the foundation of Justice Stewart's opinion, the
Jones case stands as a possible landmark in the area of civil rights under the
thirteenth amendment. The federal government is no longer restricted to combating racial discrimination only as it applies to state action or interstate commerce, although the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause have both
provided Congress with broad powers to legislate against racial discrimination.
However, by use of the thirteenth amendment, Congress can legislate directly
at the source of the evil of racial discrimination rather than incidentally, as it
does when it employs the commerce clause; and it does not have to look for
governmental involvement in discriminatory practices in order to legislate
against racial discrimination as it does under the fourteenth amendment. Congress therefore does not have to disguise its legislation with the mantle of the
commerce clause, or dilute it with the requirement of state action. Racial discrimination is an outgrowth of slavery in this country, and Congress can use the
thirteenth amendment, which abolishes slavery, to try to eliminate such discrimination.
HowARD E.

FENTON

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-ALLEGED

PAROLE

VIOLATOR HAS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT A PAROLE REVOCATION HEARING

Petitioner, an alleged parole violator, requested that retained counsel be
allowed to represent him at a parole revocation hearing. The Board of Parole
denied the request on the ground that the New York Correction Law provides
that a parolee is not entitled to be represented by counsel at a revocation hear100. See text at supra notes 49-50.
101. See supra note 50.
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ing.1 After revocation of parole, petitioner instituted a habeas corpus proceeding,
asserting that denial of counsel at the hearing violated his constitutional right
to counsel. The trial court denied the application, holding that the procedure
followed by the Board of Parole was not in contravention of the right to counsel
2
clause of either the New York Constitution or the United States Constitution.
The Appellate Division reversed. Held, the refusal of the parole authorities to
allow the parolee to be represented by counsel at a parole revocation proceeding
contravenes the state constitutional provisions pertaining to the right to counsel
and the right to be afforded due process. An order was entered requiring the
Board of Parole to hold a new revocation hearing at which petitioner would be
allowed representation by counsel. People ex rel. Combs v. La Vallee, 29 A.D.
2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (4th Dept. 1968), appeal dismissed, 22 N.Y.2d
857, 293 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1968).
The right to be represented by retained counsel at criminal trials was one

of the basic procedural rights recognized at common law.4 That the presence of
a lawyer is necessary in order to insure a fair hearing was pointed out by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Powell v. Alabama,n where it said that
" t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."0 In recent years several cases
concerned with the role of the attorney have resulted in a guarantee of repre-

sentation by counsel at all stages of a criminal proceeding which would substantially affect the rights of an accused. 7 In addition to ordinary criminal

proceedings, the Supreme Court has required the assistance of an attorney in
juvenile court proceedings 8 and in probation revocation hearings. 9 These cases

indicate that the role of the attorney is of particular significance in proceedings
which may contribute to or result in the deprivation of an individual's liberty.
Statutes in approximately one-half of the states provide for some form of
1. Section 218 of the New York Correction Law provides that an alleged parole
violator shall have "an opportunity to appear personally, but not through counsel or
others .... " (McKinney 1968).
2. People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 53 Misc. 2d 281, 278 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
3. As directed by the court, the Parole Board held a new revocation hearing at which
the relator was represented by counsel. As a result of that hearing, the parole was reinstated.
Brief for Respondent at 5, People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 22 N.Y.2d 857. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal by the state," upon the ground that the order appealed from
does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution." People
ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 22 N.Y.2d 857, 293 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1968).
4. Note, An HistoricalArgument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation,
73 Yale L.J. 1000 (1964).
5. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6. Id. at 68-69.
7. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), guaranteed the right to the appointment of counsel for the indigent accused at a state trial for a substantial crime; Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), guaranteed the right to appointment of counsel to a
convicted indigent in perfecting the appeal of right granted by a state; Assistance by counsel
at pre-trial interrogations was guaranteed by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), which
was reinforced by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
9. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
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hearing before parole will be revoked, 10 with some including a provision that a
parolee may be assisted by retained counsel at a revocation hearing." Where a
statutory provision existed, some courts have held that the right to the assistance of counsel is inherent in the right to a hearing. 12 An early federal Court
of Appeals decision recognized a right to a hearing on the ground that "[A]
statute giving him [parolee] a right to a hearing would seem to carry with it the
right to representation."' 13 In a later decision in the same Circuit, it was held
that the rights of a parolee at a revocation hearing also include the right to be
informed of his right to be represented by counsel. 14 While recognizing the
right to retained counsel, the same court in a more recent decision, held that
an indigent parolee is not entitled to the appointment of counsel at a revocation
hearing. 15
The majority of federal and state courts have not recognized a right to
representation by counsel at a parole revocation hearing. Some refuse to recognize a right to a parole revocation hearing.16 One reason given for refusing to
recognize a right to counsel or to a hearing is that a parole revocation hearing
is not a criminal proceeding within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.' 7 This
position is based on the contention that once a prisoner has been sentenced and
imprisoned, the criminal case has terminated. 18 Hyser v. Reed,'9 while recognizing a right to retained counsel, denied the appointment of counsel to an
indigent reasoning that since a parole revocation hearing is not a criminal prosecution, the parolee is not entitled to sixth amendment guarantees 0 Another
rationale for the denial of the right to representation by counsel is that parole
is not a matter of right, but rather a matter of grace or clemency granted by
10. Note, Parole: A Critique of its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L.

Rev. 702 (1963).

11. A Michigan statute provides that "Upon such [revocation] hearing such paroled
prisoner shall be allowed to be heard by counsel of his own choice, at his own expense ......
(25 Ann. Code of Mich. 1954 § 28.2310); See also 24 Fla. Sta. Ann. § 947.23 (1969) and 9
Rev. Code Wash. Ann. § 9.95.120, (1961) for similar provisions.
12. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Palumbo, 214 Md. 407, 135 A.2d 439 (1957).
In supporting its decision, the court said, ".... a necessary ingredient of a fair hearing is the
right to be represented by counsel . . !'135 A.2d at 441. A Delaware court, while deciding
a case on another issue pointed out that informing a parolee of his right to counsel would
satisfy the requirements of a statute which provided for a hearing and an appearance. State
v. Boggs, 49 Del. 277, 114 A.2d 663, 664 (1955).
13. Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1946). Subsequently, the statute
was revised to provide for the assistance of retained counsel. D.C. Code §§ 24-206 (1967).
14. Glenn v. Reed, 289 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
15. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
16. Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968), held that a state prisoner does
not have a constitutional right to a hearing on a state parole revocation; Whalen v. Gladden,
377 P.2d 561 (Ore. 1968), held that where the legislature has not provided for a hearing,
such a hearing is not compelled by due process.
17. Williams v. Patterson, 289 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968); Mottram v. State, 232 A.2d
809 (Maine 1967).
18. Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 95 (6th Cir. 1968).
19. 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
20. Id. at 237.
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legislative enactment. 2' Consequently, parole can be revoked at the discretion
of the board to which that power has been delegated 2 2 In utilizing this argument, the courts have assumed that parole is a matter which should be left to
23
the legislature
While the New York Court of Appeals has not made a determination of the
issue of counsel at parole revocation hearings, it held in In Re Hines v.
2 4
Board of Parole
that findings of the parole board are subject to judicial
review to determine if a positive statutory requirement is violated.26 The discretionary power of the parole board over parole violation has been recognized by
New York courts. 26 A recent New York Supreme Court case held that a parolee
was not entitled to constitutional due process when arrested as a delinquent
parolee, because a parole violation is not a criminal prosecution to which sixth
amendment guarantees apply.27 Prior to the decision in the instant case, the
courts of New York had not applied state or federal constitutional requirements
28
to the determination of parole violation.
In the instant case, the trial court found that since section 218 of the
Correction Law provides that a parolee may not appear through counsel, the
parole board was following the mandate of the legislature; and that such a
procedure was not in contravention of the New York or the United States Constitution. 9 The trial court took the position that the right to counsel clauses,
contained in the sixth amendment and section 6 of Article I of the New York
Constitution, were not violated because a parole revocation hearing is not a
criminal action to which those clauses apply. 0
The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the refusal of the parole
board to allow the parolee to be represented by counsel at the revocation hearing violated his state constitutional right to be represented by counsel and to
be afforded due process 31 At the outset of the decision, the court stated that the
decision was reached "without regard to the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution but upon this State's decisional
21. See Gottesman, supra note 10; DiMarco v. Greene, 385 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1967);
Malloroy v. State, 435 P.2d 254 (Idaho 1967).
22. Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968); Sorenson v. Young, 282
F. Supp. 1009 (D. Minn. 1968).
23. Whalen v. Gladden, 436 P.2d 560 (Ore. 1968).
24. 293 N.Y. 254, 56 N.E.2d 572 (1944).
25. Id. at 254. The same rationale was used to support a decision on the same issue in
Schwartzberg v. McHugh, 8 A.D.2d 570, 184 N.Y.S.2d 582 (3d Dep't. Memorandum Opinion
1959).

26. Mummiami v. New York State Board of Parole, 5 App. Div. 2d 923, 172 N.Y.S.2d
1 (3d Dep't. Memorandum Opinion 1958).
27. People ex rel. Turner v. Deegan, 55 Misc. 2d 261, N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
28.

Id. at 262.

29. People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 53 Misc. 2d 281, 283, 287 N.Y.S.2d 287, 289
(Sup. Ct. 1967).
30. Id. at 283; N.Y.S.2d at 289.
31. People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 A. D. 2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (4th Dep't.
1968).
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law and the constitutional provisions pertaining to the right to counsel and its
guarantee of due process (N.Y. Const., art. I, § 6).1"32
The "decisional law," purported to be a basis of the decision, is those state
cases which have extended the right to counsel from the trial to pre-trial and
post-trial proceedings.33 The court pointed out that two Appellate Division cases
which held that an individual is entitled to representation by counsel at probation revocation proceedings were affirmed by the Supreme Court in Mempa v.
Rhay3 4 and In Re GaultO5 Having thus established the right to representation
by counsel at probation revocation hearings, the court in the instant case
contended that the difference between parole and probation revocation hearings
was not "so vital that counsel should be mandated in the one and denied in the
30
other."
The right to counsel provision used as a basis for the decision in the instant
case provides that a person may be represented by a lawyer "in any trial, in any
court."'37 The court applied this provision to section 218 of the Correction Law
which mandates that the Board of Parole "hold a parole court" at which the
alleged violator is given an opportunity to appear.38 In supporting its position
that a parole revocation hearing is similar to an ordinary judicial proceeding,
in relation to the role of counsel, the court referred to the contention in Powell
v. Alabama39 that the right to a hearing would be of little avail if it did not
encompass the right to be represented by counsel.4 0 In supporting the decision
with the due process clause of the state constitution, the court said:
When all the legal niceties are laid aside a proceeding to revoke parole
involves the right of an individual to continue- at liberty or to be
imprisoned. It involves a deprivation of liberty just as much as did the
original criminal action and, it is submitted, falls within the 4 due
1
process provision of section 6 of Article I of our State constitution.
Shortly after (and apparently in response to) the decision in the instant
case, the New York legislature revised section 218 of the Correction Law, and
deleted the word "court" from the section and substituted more general ter32. Id. at 130; 286 N.Y.S.2d, 602.
33. Id. People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 166 N.E.2d 825 (1960);
People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 182 N.E.2d 103 (1962); People v.
Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353, 183 N.E.2d 651 (1962); People v. Donovan, 13
N.Y.2d 148, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 193 N.E.2d 628 (1963).
34. 389 U.S. 128 (1967). A person accused of a violation of probation is entitled to
appointment of counsel at the hearing.
35. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). A juvenile has a right to appointment of counsel at a juvenile
court proceeding on violation of probation.
36. People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 A. D. 2d 128, 131, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600, 603 (4th
Dep't. 1968).
37. Id. at 131, 286 N.Y.S.2d, 603.
38. New York Correction Law 218 (McKinney 1967), (emphasis added).
39. 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
40. People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 A. D. 2d 128, 131, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (4th
Dep't. 1968).
41. Id. at 131, 286 N.Y.S.2d, 603.
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minology.42 Since the decision in the instant case was based, in part, on the use
of the word "court" in the statute and in the right to counsel clause of the state
constitution, the revision raises the question of whether this court would have
reached the same result in light of the change. Nevertheless, the similarity between parole and probation, along with the due process provision of the state
constitution provides ample basis for the decision in the instant case regardless
of the wording of the statute.
The significance of the instant case is that it was based, at least in part,
upon constitutional rather than statutory grounds. Other decisions, which have
found a right to counsel at parole revocation hearings have done so on the
4
ground that the right to counsel is implied in a particular correction statute. 3
The court in the instant case contended that revocation of parole invokes the
due process clause of the state constitution, since it "involves a deprivation of
liberty just as much as did the original criminal action."44 This contention
recognizes that a parolee is entitled to the same right to due process as the
ordinary citizen. Therefore, the conditional freedom of the parolee is raised to
a level at which some degree of constitutional protection is required before that
freedom can be revoked.
The court in the instant case failed to deal with the argument of the
trial court, and other courts, that the constitutional guarantee of counsel applies
only to criminal proceedings, and that a hearing on violation of parole is not a
criminal proceeding.4 5 The fact that the hearing is not characterized as a "criminal proceeding" is not dispositive of the right to counsel in light of In Re
Gault,46 where the Supreme Court found that there is a right to counsel at
juvenile court proceedings, which have been traditionally labelled as "civil,"
rather than "criminal." The fact that the parolee has already been properly
found guilty of a crime is not determinative, because the guarantee has been
extended to a probation revocation hearing, where the guilt has been previously
determined. 47 In Mempa v. Rkgy and In Re Gault, the Supreme Court was
concerned with the effect of a hearing, rather than what it was labelled. The
effect of such a hearing could be the termination of the conditional freedom of
42. Prior to the change the section read, in part:
"Thereupon, such board of parole, shall as soon as practicable, hold a parole court at such
prison or institution and consider the case of such parole violator, who shall be given an

opportunity to appear personally, but not through counsel or others, before such board of
parole and explain the charges made against him."
After the revision, the same part read:
"The board of parole shall, as soon as practicable, give such parole violator an opportunity
to appear personally, but not through counsel or others, before three members of such board
of parole and explain the charges made against him." N.Y. Sess. Laws, Ch. 203, July 9, 1968
(emphasis added).
43. See notes 12, 13 supra.
44. People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 A. D. 2d 128, 131, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600, 603 (4th

Dep't. 1968).
45. See notes 17-20, supra.
46. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
47. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
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an individual. Since, an adverse determination of a parole revocation hearing
would have a similar effect, the right to counsel should be recognized.
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that an
accused parole violator had a right to counsel at a revocation hearing on the
ground that the hearing was a part of the original criminal proceeding. 48 In
basing the decision on Mempa v. Rhay, the Pennsylvania court contended that
the parole revocation hearing was a "critical stage" of the criminal action. It
was also pointed out that the lack of review of a determination by the parole
board made the need for counsel all the more important. 49 One distinction
between parole revocation and probation revocation is that a revocation of
probation results in the initial imposition of the sentence; while a revocation of
parole merely reinstates the sentence which was set at the original criminal
actionY0° In much the same manner as the court in the instant case, the Pennsylvania court found that this distinction was not a sufficient basis for allowing
51
counsel in one proceeding and not in the other.
The decision in the instant case that retained counsel should be allowed at
a revocation hearing, suggests the question of whether it is also necessary to
require appointment of counsel for an indigent parolee. If the contention of the
court that a parole revocation hearing is no different from an original criminal
action is accepted, Gideon v. Wainwright would require appointment of counsel. 52 The Supreme Court held that appointment of counsel is required in
juvenile court proceedings and in probation hearings. 53 These cases indicate
that a necessary element of due process is appointment of counsel; and that due
process is required in proceedings which substantially affect the freedom of an
individual. If representation by retained counsel is a fundamental right based
on either the state or federal constitution, the equal protection provision of the
fourteenth amendment would seem to require appointment of counsel to the
indigent parolee.
The instant decision also raises the question of whether the right to representation by counsel applies to a hearing to determine initial eligibility for
parole. However, since conditional freedom does not exist until a prisoner has
been awarded parole, there is no deprivation of freedom involved in that hearing.
Moreover, the necessity of an attorney is not as great, since an eligibility hearing is concerned with general circumstances rather than specific violations as
in a revocation hearing. 54 Thus, allowing counsel at revocation hearings would
not necessarily require that counsel be allowed at an eligibility hearing.
48. Commonwealth v. Tinson, 4 Criminal Law Reporter 2350 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1969).
49. Id. at 2351.

50. New York Correction Law § 218 (McKinney's 1968); New York Code of Criminal
Procedure § 935 (McKinney's 1968).
51. Commonwealth v. Tinson, 4 Criminal Law Reporter 2350, 2351 (Pa. Sup. Ct.
1969).
52. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
53. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
54. New York Correction Law § 213 (McKinney's 1968).
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The value of a lawyer in a parole revocation hearing is clearly illustrated
by the results of the instant case, because the parolee was released on parole
after the new hearing at which he was represented by counsel.r,5 Perhaps the
most compelling reason for the assistance of counsel is that once a parolee is
suspected of a violation, he is apprehended and incarcerated until the time of the
hearing. 56 In such a position, the parolee is unable to prepare a defense to
charges or to procure information to explain mitigating circumstances. Another
reason which justifies the presence of an attorney is that a revocation hearing
involves only persons who are part of the parole organization. As an outside
party, an attorney could be essential in assuring a fair hearing. In offsetting the
one-sided nature of the hearing, an attorney will lessen the possibility of a revocation without good cause.
The revision of the Correction Law is apparently an indication that the
legislature did not consider the right to counsel a necessary part of the parole
revocation procedure. 57 A possible justification for this position is that the
presence of counsel at revocation hearings, may result in an undue burden upon
the parole process, causing delays and additional expense.58 The possible interference with the efficient administration of the parole program is another consideration that weighs against the desirability of allowing counsel at the hearings. 9
Two New York Supreme Court decisions reached after the revision of the
Correction Law indicate that the issue of counsel at parole revocation hearings
remains unsettled. One case followed the decision in the instant case, 60 while
the other came to the opposite conclusion.6 1 In order to settle the question of
the right to counsel, the courts must deal with the more basic issue of the constitutional status of the parolee. The rehabilitative purpose of parole might be
better served, if the status of the parolee approached that of the ordinary
citizen. The knowledge that his parole would not be revoked without some safeguards against an arbitrary determination could enhance the confidence of the
parolee in his status, thereby aiding in rehabilitation. Finally, the granting of
parole is a recognition that an individual is entitled to freedom; and although
the freedom is only conditional, it should nevertheless be protected by some
minimal guarantee of due process.

S. D.
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55. See note 3, supra.
56. New York Correction Law § 216 (McKinney's 1968).
57. See note 42, supra.
58. Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 101, 102 (6th Cir. 1968), (dissenting opinion).
59. Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1967).
60. Menechino v. Division of Parole, 57 Misc. 2d 865, 293 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
61. People ex rel. Johnson v. Follette, 58 Misc. 2d 474, 295 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct.
1968).

